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CHAPTER XIV: EASTERN BIAS OR EASTERN POLICY

There are two considerations which induce me to make a special analysis of Germany’s attitude towards Russia. These are, that firstly, this may prove to be the most important problem which German foreign policy has to solve, and secondly; this problem is, at the same time, the touchstone which will test the political capacity of the young National Socialist Movement for clear thinking and adopting the right course of action. I must confess that the second consideration has often been a source of great anxiety to me. The members of our Movement are not recruited from circles which are habitually indifferent to public affairs, but mostly from among men who hold more or less extreme views. Such being the case, it is only natural that their understanding of foreign politics should at first labour under the prejudices and inadequate knowledge of those circles to which they formerly belonged by virtue of their political and ideological opinions. This is true not only of the men who come to us from the Left. On the contrary, however harmful may have been the kind of teaching they formerly received in regard to these problems, in very many cases this was, in part, at least, counterbalanced by the sound and natural instincts which they retained. In such cases it is only necessary to substitute a better teaching in place of the earlier influences, in order to transform the instinct of self-preservation and other sound instinct into valuable assets. On the other hand, it is much more difficult to train a man to see clearly in political matters, if his previous education in this field was no less devoid of sense and logic, but if, in addition, he has sacrificed the last residue of his natural instincts on the altar of objective thinking. It is particularly difficult to induce such representatives of our so-called intellectual circles to adopt a realistic and logical attitude in protecting their own interests and the interests of their nation in its relations with foreign countries.

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Their minds are overladen with a large burden of prejudices and absurd ideas and, as if this were not enough, they have lost or renounced every instinct of self-preservation. Against these men the National Socialist Movement has to fight a hard battle, too, and the struggle is all the harder because, though very often they are utterly incompetent, they are so self-conceited that, without the slightest justification, they even look, down on others whose opinions are more sound. These arrogant snobs, who pretend to know better than other people, are wholly incapable of calmly and coolly analysing a problem land of weighing the pros and cons, which is the necessary preliminary to any decision or action taken in the field of foreign politics. Since these particular circles are, at present, beginning to deflect our foreign policy in the most disastrous way from protecting the real interests of our people, in order to serve their own fantastic ideologies, I feel it incumbent upon me to give my own followers a clear exposition of the most important problem in our foreign policy, namely, our relations with Russia. I shall deal with it as thoroughly as may be necessary to make it generally understood and as far as the limits of this book permit. Let me begin by making the following general remarks. If, by foreign policy, we mean the establishment of relations between any nation and the other nations on this earth, we must admit that the establishment of such relations must depend on certain definite facts. Moreover, we, as National Socialists, must lay down the following principle as regards the essential characteristics of the foreign policy pursued by a völkisch State. The first object of the foreign policy of a völkisch State is to safeguard the existence on this earth of the race which has been organised as an entity by this State, by the establishment of a healthy, enduring and natural proportion between the size and the growth of the population, on the one hand, and the area and resources of its territory, on the other. The only proportion which can be termed ‘healthy’ is one in which the resources of the soil are sufficient, to guarantee the nation’s food-supply. Any condition which falls short of this is none the less unhealthy for the fact that it may endure for centuries or even thousands of years.

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Sooner or later, this lack of proportion must of necessity lead to the decline; or even annihilation of the people concerned. Only a sufficiently large space on this earth can assure the independent existence of a people. The extent of the territory necessary for the accommodation of the national population must not be estimated in the light of present exigencies or even of its agricultural productivity in relation to the number of the population. In the first volume of this book, under the heading, ‘Germany’s Policy of Alliances before the War’, I have already explained that the territorial dimensions of a State are of importance not only as the immediate source of the nation’s food-supply, but also from the military standpoint. Once a people have become self-supporting as a result of the adequate area of its territory, the next consideration is how to take the necessary steps to safeguard his territory. National security depends on the political and military strength of a State and this, in turn, depends on its geographical situation looked at from the military point of view. Thus the German nation could assure its own future only by becoming a World Power. For nearly two thousand years the defence of our national interests (as we ought to describe our more or less successful foreign political activities) was a matter of world history. We ourselves have witnessed this, since the gigantic international struggle of the German people for their existence on this earth, and it was carried out in such a way that it has become known in the annals of history as the World War. When Germany entered this struggle it was presumed that she was a World Power. I say ‘presumed’ because in reality she was no such thing. If, in 1914, there had been a different proportion between the German population and its territorial area, Germany would really have been a World Power and, leaving other factors out of count, the War would have ended in her favour.

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It is neither my task nor my intention here to discuss what would have happened if certain conditions had been fulfilled, but I feel it absolutely incumbent on me to depict the present situation in its true light, and to point out its weaknesses which give cause for alarm, in order to make at least those who belong to the National Socialist Movement aware of what steps must be taken. Germany is not a World Power to-day. Even though our present military weakness could be overcome, we would still have no claim to be called a World Power. What importance has any State on earth in which the proportion between the size of the population and the territorial area is so hopelessly unsatisfactory as in the present German Reich? In an epoch in which the world is being gradually portioned out among States, many of whom embrace almost whole continents, one cannot speak of a World Power in referring to a State whose political mother-country is limited to a territorial area of barely five-hundred-thousand square kilometres. Looked at purely from the territorial point of view, the area of the German Reich is insignificant in comparison with that of so-called World Powers. It would be wrong to cite the case of Britain for the purpose of disproving this statement, because Great Britain, the mother-country, is in reality the great metropolis of the British World Empire, which covers almost one-fourth of the earth’s surface. Among the giant States we must also consider the United States of America, Russia and China. These are enormous territories, some of which have more than ten times the area of the present German Reich. France must also be ranked among these States. Not only because she is constantly increasing the strength of her army by recruiting coloured troops from the population of her gigantic empire, but also because, from the racial point of view, she is rapidly becoming Negroid to such an extent that we can actually speak of the formation of an African state on European soil. The contemporary colonial policy of France cannot be compared with that of Germany in the past. If France develops along the lines it has taken in our day, and should that development continue for the next three hundred years, all traces of French blood will finally be lost in the formation of a Euro-African mulatto state.

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This would represent a formidable and compact colonial territory stretching from the Rhine to the Congo, inhabited by an inferior race which had developed through a slow and steady process of bastardization. In this, French colonial policy differs from the policy followed by the old Germany. The former German colonial policy consisted in half measures as did almost everything undertaken at that time It did not aim at the acquisition of new territory for the settlement of German nationals nor did it make any attempt (criminal though this might have been) to reinforce the power of the Reich through the enlistment of black troops. The Askari units in German East Africa represented a small and hesitant step in this direction, but in reality they served only for the defence of the colony itself. The idea of transporting black troops to a European theatre of war— apart entirely from the practical impossibility of doing so during the World War—was never entertained as a proposal to be carried out under favourable conditions; whereas the French, on the contrary, always looked on this as the underlying motive and justification for their colonial activities. Thus we find in the world to-day a number of powerful States which are not only superior to Germany as regards the numerical strength of their population, but which also possess in territorial area the chief support of their political power. Never has the position of the German Reich, judged from the point of view of its area and the size of its population, been so unfavourable in comparison with other States of whilom importance, as at the beginning of its history two thousand years ago and again to-day. In that other era we were a young people and we stormed a world of decadent giant States, the last of which was Rome, to whose overthrow we contributed. To-day we find ourselves in a world of great and powerful States among which our own Reich is steadily losing in significance. We must always face this bitter truth with clear and calm minds. We must study the area and population of the German Reich in relation to the other States and compare them throughout the centuries. Then, I know, everyone will realise to his consternation that what I said at the outset is true, namely, that Germany is no longer a World Power, whether she be strong or weak from the military point of view.

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There is no comparison between our position and that of the other States throughout the world, and this is to be attributed to the ill-fated foreign policy pursued by our governments, to the fact that our foreign policy failed absolutely to pursue a definite aim with unswerving perseverance and also to the fact that we have lost every sound impulse and instinct for self-preservation. If the National Socialist Movement is to be credited by posterity with having fulfilled a great mission on behalf of our nation it must fully recognise the serious nature of our actual position in the world, and struggle bravely and doggedly against the aimlessness and inefficiency which have hitherto led the German people to pursue a false course as regards foreign policy. Without respect for ‘tradition,’ and without any pre-conceived notions, the Movement must find the courage to organise our national forces, and set them on the path which will lead them beyond the confines of the ‘living space’ which is theirs to-day, to the acquisition of new territory. Thus the Movement will save the German people from the danger of perishing or of becoming slaves in the service of any other people. Our Movement must seek to abolish the present lack of proportion between our population and the area of our national territory, considered as the source of our maintenance or as a basis of political power. It ought also to strive to abolish the contrast between past history and the hopelessly powerless position in which we are to-day. In striving to do so, it must bear in mind the fact that we are the custodians of the highest form of civilisation on this earth, that we have a correspondingly high duty and that we shall fulfil this duty only if we inspire the German people with race-consciousness, so that they will concern themselves not merely with the breeding of dogs, horses and cats, but also care for the purity of their own blood. When I say that the foreign policy hitherto followed by Germany has been aimless and ineffectual, the proof of my statement will be found in the actual failure of this policy.

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Were our people intellectually backward, or did they lack courage, the final results of their efforts could not have been worse than those of which we are witnesses to-day. We must not allow ourselves to be misled by developments during the last decades before the War, because we must not measure the strength of a State taken by itself, but in comparison with other States. Now, this comparison shows that not only had the strength of the other States increased more steadily than that of Germany, but that in the long run it proved to be greater, so that, despite her apparent prosperity, Germany gradually dropped further behind in the race with other States. In short, the difference in size increases much to our detriment. Even in the size of our population we lagged behind, and kept on losing ground. Since the courage of our people is unsurpassed by that of any other in the world and their sacrifice in defence of their existence greater than that of any other nation, their failure can be ascribed only to the false way in which this sacrifice was used. If, in this connection, we examine the chain of political vicissitudes through which our people have passed during more than a thousand years, recalling the innumerable struggles and wars and investigating the results as we have them before us to-day, we must confess that from the sea of blood only three phenomena have emerged which we can consider as the lasting fruits of a definite foreign policy, or, in fact of a policy at all. These were, firstly, the colonization of the Ostmark, which was mainly the work of the Bavarian secondly, the conquest and settlement of the territory east of the Elbe; and thirdly, the organisation of the Brandenburg-Prussian State, which was the work of the Hohenzollerns and which became the model for, and the nucleus of, a new Reich. An instructive lesson for the future! These first two great successes of our foreign policy turned out to be the most enduring. Without them our people would play no part in the world to-day. These achievements were the first, and unfortunately the only, successful attempts to establish a satisfactory balance between cur increasing population and the area of our country, and we must regard it as a fatal mistake that our German historians have never correctly appreciated these two outstanding achievements which were of such significance for the following generations.

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On the other hand, they wrote panegyrics on many other things, on heroism displayed in the pursuit of a fantastic aim and on innumerable adventurous campaigns and wars, instead of realising that these latter had no significance in relation to the main course of our national development. The third great success achieved by our political activity was the establishment of the Prussian State and the development of a particular State concept which grew out of this. To the same source we must attribute the organisation of the instinct of national self-preservation and self-defence in the German Army, an achievement which suited the modem world. The transformation of the idea of self-defence on the part of the individual into the duty of national defence is derived from the Prussian State and the new State concept which it introduced. It would be impossible to over-estimate the importance of this process. The German nation, which, as a result of racial disintegration, had become the victim of exaggerated individualism, partially regained, through the disciplinary training of the Prussian Army, its capacity for organisation. What other nations still retain of the original herd instinct, we regained, in some measure, for the national community by the artificial means of military training. Consequently, the abolition of compulsory national military service— which may have no significance for dozens of other nations—had fatal consequences for us. Let ten generations of Germans be without the corrective and educative effect of military training and delivered over to the evil effects of their racial and, consequently, ideological disintegration and our people would lose the last relics of an independent existence on this earth. The German intellect could then make its contribution to civilisation only through the medium of individuals living under the rule of foreign nations and its origin would remain unknown, while acting as the fertilizing manure of civilisation, until the last residue of Nordic-Aryan blood in us had become corrupted or extinct.

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It is a remarkable fact that the real political successes achieved by our people during their millennial struggles are better appreciated and understood by our adversaries than by ourselves. Even to-day we wax enthusiastic about an act of heroism which robbed our people of millions of their best racial stock and turned out completely fruitless in the end. The distinction between the real political successes which our people have achieved in the course of their long history and the futile aims for which the blood of the nation has been shed is of supreme importance in determining our policy now and in the future. We National Socialists must never allow ourselves to join in the huzzaing patriotism of our contemporary bourgeois circles. It would be fatal for us to look upon the developments immediately before the War as in any way binding us in the choice of our own course. We can recognise no obligation devolving on us which may have its origin in any historical phase of the nineteenth century. In contradiction to the policy of those who represented that period, we must take our stand on the principles already mentioned in regard to foreign policy, namely, the necessity for bringing our territorial area into accord with the number of our population. From the past we can learn only one lesson, and this is that the aim which is to be pursued in our political conduct must be two-fold, namely, (1) the acquisition of territory as the objective of our foreign policy and (2) the establishment of a new, uniform and ideologically secure foundation as the objective of our political activities at home. I shall deal briefly with the question of how far our territorial aims are justified according to ethical and moral principles. This is all the more necessary here because, in our so-called völkisch circles, there are all kinds of smooth-tongued phrase-mongers who try to persuade the German people that the great aim of their foreign policy ought to be to right the wrongs of 1918, while at the same time they consider it incumbent on them to assure the whole world of the brotherly spirit and sympathy of the German people.

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In regard to this point I should like to make the following preliminary statement. To demand that the 1914 frontiers should be restored is a glaring political absurdity that is fraught with such consequences as to make the claim itself appear criminal. The confines of the Reich as they existed in 1914 were thoroughly illogical, because they were not really complete, in the sense of including all the members of the German people, nor were they reasonable, in view of the geographical exigencies of military defence. They were not the outcome of a well-considered political plan, they were temporary frontiers established in virtue of a political struggle that had not been fought to a finish, and indeed they were partly the chance result of circumstances. One would be equally justified (and in many cases better justified) in selecting any other year in our history and in demanding that the objective of our foreign policy should be the re-establishment of the conditions then existing. The demands I have mentioned are quite characteristic of our bourgeois compatriots, who, in such matters, take no politically productive thought for the future. They live only in the past and indeed only in the immediate past, for even their retrospect does not go back beyond their own times. The law of inertia binds them to the present order of things, leading them to oppose every attempt to change this. Their opposition, however, never takes the form of any kind of active defence, it is merely passive obstinacy. Therefore, we must regard it as quite natural that the political horizon of such people should not reach beyond 1914. In proclaiming that the aim of their political activities is to have the frontiers of that time restored, they only help to close up the rifts that are already becoming apparent in the league which our enemies have formed against us. Only on these grounds can we explain the fact that eight years after a world conflagration in which a number of allied belligerents had aspirations and aims that were partly in conflict with one another, the coalition of the victors still remains more or less solid.

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Each of those States in its turn profited by the German collapse. In the fear which they all felt of our strength, the Great Powers maintained a mutual silence about their individual feelings of envy and enmity towards one another. They felt that to carry into effect a general process of expropriation of the Reich’s possessions would be the surest guarantee against the possibility of our resurgence. A bad conscience and fear of the strength of our people made up the durable cement which has held the members of that league together, even up to the present moment; nor have they been deceived by us. Inasmuch as our bourgeoisie sets up the restoration of the 1914 frontiers as the aim of Germany’s political programme, each member of the enemy coalition who might otherwise be inclined to withdraw from it, clings to the coalition for fear that he might, having lost the support of his allies, become an isolated object of attack. Each individual State feels itself endangered and threatened by this battle-cry, and that battle-cry itself is absurd, for the two following reasons: Firstly, because there is no available means of extricating it from the twilight atmosphere of club meetings and transforming it into something real. Secondly, because even if it could be carried into effect the result would be so futile that it would not be worth while to risk the blood of our people once again for such a purpose. There can be scarcely any doubt whatsoever that only through bloodshed could we achieve the restoration of the 1914 frontiers. One must have the simple mind of a child to believe that the revision of the Versailles Treaty can be obtained by indirect means and by beseeching the clemency of the victors—apart from the fact that for this we should need a Talleyrand, and there is no Talleyrand among us. Fifty per cent of our politicians are artful dodgers who are without character and hostile to our people, while the other fifty per cent is made up of well-meaning, harmless, and complaisant incompetents. Moreover, times have changed since the Congress of Vienna, it is no longer princes or their courtesans who haggle and bargain about State frontiers, but the inexorable cosmopolitan Jew who fights for dominion over the nations.

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The sword is the only means whereby a nation can ward off that strangle-hold. Only when the concentrated might of rampant patriotic fervour is organised can it defy the menace of international enslavement of the nations. Such a course of action entails, and always will entail, bloodshed. If we are once convinced that the future of Germany calls for supreme effort, then, apart from considerations of political prudence, we are in duty bound to set up an aim that is worthy of that effort and to struggle to achieve it. The 1914 frontiers are of no significance for the future of the German nation. They did not serve to protect us in the past, nor do they offer any guarantee for our defence in the future. These frontiers do not help the German people to achieve internal unity, nor do they serve to safeguard its food-supplies. From the military standpoint these frontiers are neither strategically good nor even satisfactory. Finally, they cannot serve to improve our present position in relation to other World Powers, or rather in relation to the real World Powers. They will not lessen the discrepancy between ourselves and Great Britain, nor help us to rival the United States its size. Not only that, but they would not serve to lessen substantially the importance of France in international politics. One thing alone is certain, namely, the attempt to restore the frontiers of 1914, even if it proved successful, would lead to a further draining of the blood of our nation to such an extent that no virile men would be left to execute the revolutions and perform the deeds necessary in order to assure the future existence of the nation. On the contrary, under the intoxicating influence of such a superficial success further aims would be renounced, all the more so because so-called ‘national honour’ would seem to be vindicated and new ports would be opened, at least for a certain time, to our commercial development. In the face of all this we National Socialists must adhere firmly to the aim that we have set for our foreign policy, namely, that the German people must be guaranteed that living-space to which it is entitled, and only in pursuance of such an aim can the shedding of the blood of our people be justified in the eyes of God, and future generations of Germans.

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God—because we are sent into this world to struggle for our daily bread, as creatures to whom nothing is donated and who must be able to win and maintain their position as lords of the earth by virtue of their own intelligence and courage. Germans—in the eyes of further generations of Germans, since the blood of no German should be spilt unless it be to guarantee the lives of a thousand others yet unborn. The territory on which our German peasants will one day be able to rear sturdy sons will justify the sacrifice of the lives of sons of peasants to-day, and though the statesmen responsible for this sacrifice may be persecuted by their contemporaries, posterity will absolve them from the charge of having been guilty of bloodshed and of sacrificing the nation. Here I must protest sharply against those völkisch scribblers who pretend that such territorial extension would be a ‘violation of the sacred rights of man’ and accordingly attack it in their literary effusions. One never knows what are the hidden forces behind the activities of such persons. But it is certain that the confusion which they provoke suits the game our enemies are playing against our nation and is in accordance with their wishes. By the conception of this attitude such scribblers contribute in criminal fashion to weaken from within and to destroy our people’s will to defend their own vital interests by the only effective means that can be used for that purpose, for no nation on earth possesses a square yard of territory by decree of a higher Will and by virtue of a higher Right. The German frontiers are the outcome of chance and are only temporary frontiers that have been established as the result of political struggles which took place at various times. The same is also true of the frontiers which demarcate the territories in which other nations live. Only an imbecile could look on the physical geography of the globe as fixed and unchangeable. Actually, it represents only an apparent interval in a continual evolutionary process due to the certain action of the formidable forces of Nature, and is liable to destruction and transformation to-morrow through still more formidable forces.

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So, too, in the lives of the nations the confines of their ‘living space’ are liable to change. State frontiers are established by human beings and may be altered by human beings. The fact that a nation has acquired an enormous territorial area is no reason why other nations should for ever acknowledge its right to that territory. At most, the possession of such territory is a proof of the might of the conqueror and the weakness of those who submit to him and this might alone is right. If the German people is cramped in an insufficient living space and is, for that reason, faced with a hopeless future, it is not by the law of Destiny, and the refusal to accept such a situation is by no means a violation of Destiny’s laws. Just as no Higher Power has allotted more territory to other nations than to the German nation, an unjust distribution of territory cannot constitute an offence against such a Power. The land in which we now live was not a gift bestowed by Heaven on our forefathers, but was conquered by them at the risk of their lives. Thus, now, in future our people will not acquire territory and with it the means of subsistence as a favour at the hands of any other nation, but will have to win it by the power of a triumphant sword. To-day we are all convinced of the necessity for regulating our position with regard to France; but our success here will be ineffectual in the vain if the general aims of our foreign policy stop at that. It can have significance for us only if it serves to cover our flank in the struggle for that extension of territory which is necessary for the existence of our people in Europe, for colonial acquisitions will not solve that question. It can be solved only by the acquisition of such territory for the settlement of our people as will extend the area of the mother-country and thereby not only keep the newly-settled population in close touch with the parent-country, but will guarantee the entire territory the enjoyment of those advantages accruing from its total size.

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The völkisch Movement must not play the advocate for ether nations, but beg the protagonist of its own nation. Otherwise it would he superfluous and, above all, it would have no right to clamour against the past, for it would then be repeating the action of the past. The old German policy suffered from having been determined by dynastic considerations, the new German policy must not adopt the sentimentally cosmopolitan attitude of völkisch circles. Above all, we must riot form a police guard for the famous ‘small oppressed nations,’ but we must be the soldiers of the German nation. We National Socialists must go still further. The right to territory may become a duty when a great nation seems destined to go under unless its territory be extended, and that is particularly true when the nation in question is not a handful of Negroes, but the Germanic mother of all those who have given culture to the modern world. Germany will either become a World Power or will not continue to exist, but in order to become a World Power she needs that territorial area which would give her the necessary importance to-day and assure the existence of her citizens. Therefore, we National Socialists have purposely broken away from the line of conduct followed by pre-war Germany in foreign policy. We are beginning at the point at which our ancestors left off six hundred years ago. We are putting a stop to the eternal German trek towards Southern and Western Europe and are turning our eyes towards the lands that lie to the east of us. We are abandoning, once and for all, the colonial and commercial policy of pre-war days and are making a start upon the future policy of territorial expansion, but when we speak of new territory in Europe to-day we must think principally of Russia and the border states under her rule. Destiny itself seems to point the way for us here. In delivering Russia over to Bolshevism, Fate robbed the Russian people of that intellectual class which had once created the Russian State and was the guarantee for its existence.

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The Russian State as such was not the outcome of the ability of the Slav to establish a constitution, but rather a marvellous example of the constructive political activity of the Germanic element in a race of inferior worth. This is the way in which many mighty empires throughout the world were created. More than once inferior races with Germanic organisers and rulers as their leaders became formidable States and continued to exist as long as the racial nucleus which had originally created the State remained. For centuries, Russia has lived on this Germanic nucleus of its governing classes, but to-day this nucleus has been practically exterminated. The Jew has taken its place. Just as it is impossible for the Russian, on his own, to shake off the Jewish yoke so, too, it is impossible for the Jew to keep this mighty State in existence for any lengthy period of time. He himself is by no means an organising element, but rather a ferment of decomposition. This colossal empire in the East is ripe for dissolution, and the end of the Jewish domination in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a State. We are chosen by Destiny to be the witnesses of a catastrophe which will afford the most striking confirmation of the völkisch theory of race. It is our task, and the mission of the National Socialist Movement, to develop in our people that political mentality which will enable them to realise that the aim which they must set themselves in future could not find fulfilment in the glorious enthusiasm of a victorious campaign fought with the ardour of an Alexander the Great. That the Jew should declare himself bitterly hostile to such a policy is only natural, for the Jew knows better than any other what the adoption of this line of conduct will mean for his own future. That fact alone ought to teach all genuine nationalists that this new orientation is the right one, but, unfortunately, the reverse is the case. Not only among the members of the German National Party, but also in purely völkisch circles, violent opposition is being raised against this Eastern European policy, and in connection with that opposition, as in all such cases, the authority of great men is cited.

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The spirit of Bismarck is evoked in defence of a policy which is as stupid as it is impossible, and is in the highest degree detrimental to the German people. They say that Bismarck attached great importance to the maintenance of good relations with Russia. To a certain extent, that is true, but they quite forget to add that he laid equal stress on the importance of good relations with Italy, for example. Indeed, the same Herr von Bismarck once concluded an alliance with Italy so that he might more easily settle accounts with Austria. Why is this policy not continued to-day? The answer will be to the effect that the Italy of to-day is not the Italy of that time. Well then, honourable sirs, permit me to remind you that the Russia of to-day is no longer the Russia of that time. Bismarck never dreamt of laying down a political course of action which, from the tactical point of view, was to hold good for all time. He was too much the master of the hour to bind himself in that way. The question, therefore, ought not to be what did Bismarck do then, but rather what would he do to-day. And that question is much easier to answer. His political sagacity would never allow him to ally himself with a State that is doomed to disappear. Moreover, Bismarck looked upon the colonial and commercial policy of his time with mixed feelings, because at first, his chief concern was to find the surest way of consolidating and internally strengthening the state system which he himself had created. That was the sole reason why, at that time, he welcomed Russian protection in the rear, which gave him a free hand for his activities in the West, but what was then advantageous to Germany would now be detrimental. As early as 1920–21, the young National Socialist Movement was slowly, beginning to make itself felt in the political world and was spoken of in various circles as the movement for the liberation of the German nation. At that time it was approached from various quarters with the object of establishing definite relations with the liberationist movements in other countries.

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This was quite in keeping with the much-advertised ‘League of Oppressed Nations.’ The persons concerned were, for the most part, representatives of some of the Balkan States and also of Egypt and India. They always impressed me as loquacious gentlemen who gave themselves airs, but had no real backing. Not a few Germans, however, especially in the nationalist camp, allowed themselves to be taken in by these pompous Orientals, and in the person of some Indian or Egyptian student they believed at once that they were face to face with a ‘representative’ of India or Egypt. They did not realise that, in most cases, they were dealing with persons who had no backing and who were not authorised to conclude any sort of agreement whatsoever, so that the practical result of any contact with such individuals was nil, unless one chose to enter the time spent thus as a dead loss. I was always on my guard against these attempts, not only because I had something better to do than to waste weeks in such sterile ‘discussions,’ but also because I believed that even if one were dealing with authorised representatives of such nations, the whole affair would be bound to turn out futile, if not positively harmful. Even in peace-time it was lamentable enough that the German policy of alliances, because it had no active and aggressive aims in view, ended in a defensive association of antiquated States which, as far as history was concerned were already on the retired list. There was little to be said either for the alliance with Austria or for that with Turkey. While the greatest military and industrial States of the earth had joined together in a league for purposes of active aggression, a few old and effete States were got together, and with this antique bric-a-brac an attempt was made to face an active world-coalition. Germany has had to pay dearly for that mistaken foreign policy and yet not dearly enough to prevent our incorrigible visionaries from falling into the same error again, for the attempt to bring about the disarmament of the all-powerful victorious States through a ‘League of Oppressed Nations’ is not only ridiculous, but disastrous.

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It is disastrous because in that way the attention of the German people is again being diverted from real possibilities, which they abandon for the sake of fanciful and fruitless hopes and illusions. The German of to-day is like a drowning man who clutches at any straw. At the same time many of the people who are misled in this way are otherwise highly educated. Whenever some will-o’-the-wisp of a fantastic hope appears these people immediately pursue it. No matter whether it be a League of Oppressed Nations, a League of Nations, or some other fantastic invention, thousands of ingenuous souls will always be found to believe in it. I well remember the childishly incomprehensible hope that Britain’s downfall in India was imminent, which was cherished by völkisch circles in the years 1920–21. A few Asiatic mountebank, who may even have been sincere ‘champions of Indian freedom,’ were then at a loose end in Europe and succeeded in inspiring otherwise quite reasonable people with the fixed notion that the British World Empire, of which India was the hub, was just about to collapse there. They never realised that this was wishful thinking, nor did they stop to think how absurd their hopes were, for inasmuch as they expected the end of the British Empire and of Britain’s power to follow the collapse of its dominion over India, they themselves admitted that India was of paramount importance to Britain. It is more than probable that this vital question was not in the nature of a mystery known only to the prophets of German völkisch circles, but also to those in whose hands lay the shaping of British history. It is simply puerile to suppose that in Britain itself the importance of India for the British Empire was not adequately appreciated. It is a proof of failure to have learned a lesson from the World War and of a thorough misunderstanding and inability to recognise the quality of Anglo-Saxon determination, if anyone imagines that Britain would let India go without first putting forth the last ounce of her strength in a struggle to hold it. Moreover, it shows how complete is the ignorance prevailing in Germany as to the manner in which Britain administers her Empire and permeates it with her spirit.

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Britain will never lose India unless her administrative machinery becomes corrupt as a result of racial contamination (which is at present entirely out of the question in India), or unless she is overcome by the sword of some powerful enemy. Indian risings will never bring this about. We Germans have had sufficient experience to know how hard it is to overcome Britain, and apart from all this, I as a Teuton, would far rather see India under British rule than under that of any other nation. The hopes founded on a legendary rising in Egypt were just as chimerical. The ‘Holy War’ may give our German nincompoops the pleasing illusion that others are now prepared to shed their blood for them. Indeed this cowardly speculation is almost always the father of such hopes, but in actual fact the ‘Holy War’ would soon be brought to a sanguinary conclusion under the withering fire of British machine-guns and a hail of British shells. A coalition of cripples cannot attack a powerful State which is determined, if necessary, to shed the last drop of its blood in order to preserve its existence. I, as a nationalist, who estimate the worth of humanity according to racial standards, must, in recognising the inferiority of the so-called ‘oppressed nations’, refuse to link the destiny of my own people with the destiny of theirs. To-day we must take up the same attitude towards Russia. The Russia of to-day, deprived of its Germanic ruling class, is, apart from the secret designs of its new rulers, no suitable ally in the struggle for German liberty. From the purely military point of view, a Russo-German coalition waging war against Western Europe, and probably against the whole world on that account, would be catastrophic for us. The struggle would have to be fought out, not on Russian, but on German territory, without Germany being able to receive from Russia the slightest effective support. The military forces at the disposal of the present German Reich are so small and so inadequate for the waging of a foreign war that it would be impossible to defend our frontiers against Western Europe, Britain included.

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The industrial area of Germany would have to be abandoned undefended before the concentrated attack of our adversaries, It must be added that between Germany and Russia there is the Polish State, completely in the hands of the French. Should Germany and Russia together wage war against Western Europe, Russia would have to overthrow Poland before the first Russian soldier could be conveyed to a German front, but it is less a question of soldiers than of technical equipment. In this respect our plight during the World War would be repeated, but in a more terrible manner. At that time, German, industry had to be drained to help our glorious allies, and on the technical side Germany had to carry on the war almost alone. In this new hypothetical war Russia, as a technical factor, would count for nothing. We should have practically nothing to oppose to the general mechanisation of the world, which in the next war will assume overwhelming and decisive proportions. In this important field Germany has not only shamefully lagged behind, but would, with the little she has, have to reinforce Russia, which at the present moment does not possess a single factory capable of producing a motor-car in good running order. Under such conditions such a struggle would assume the character of sheer slaughter. The youth of Germany would have to shed more of its blood than it did even in the World War; for, as always, it would fall to us to bear the brunt of the fighting, and the result would be an inevitable catastrophe. Even supposing that a miracle took place and that this war did not end in the total annihilation of Germany, the final result would be that the German nation would be bled white, and, surrounded as she would be by great military States, her real situation would be in no way ameliorated. It is useless to object here that in case of an alliance with Russia we should not think of an immediate war or that anyhow we should have the means of making thorough preparations for war.

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This is absurd, since an alliance which is not for the purpose of waging war has no meaning and no value. The object of forming an alliance is to wage war. Even though, at the moment when an alliance is concluded, the prospect of war is a distant one, still the idea of the situation developing towards war is the reason underlying the formation of an alliance. It is out of the question to think that the other Powers would be deceived as to the purpose of such an alliance. A Russo-German coalition would either remain a mere scrap of paper (in which case it would have no meaning for us), or the terms of the agreement would be put into effect, and in that case the rest of the world would be forewarned. It would be childish to think that in such circumstances Britain and France would wait ten years to give the Russo-German alliance time to complete its technical preparations. Far from it, the storm would break over Germany immediately. The fact of forming an alliance with Russia would, therefore; be the signal for a new war, the result of which would be the end of Germany. To these considerations the following must be added:

(1) Those who are in power in Russia to-day have no intention of forming an honourable alliance or of remaining true to it, if they did. It must never be forgotten that the present rulers of Russia are blood-stained criminals, that here we have the dregs of humanity which, favoured by the circumstances of a tragic moment, overran a great State, and, in their lust for blood, killed and extirpated millions of educated people belonging to the ruling classes, and that now for nearly ten years they have ruled with a savage tyranny such as has never been known. It must not be forgotten that these rulers belong to a people in which the most bestial cruelty is allied to a capacity for artful mendacity and which, to-day more than ever, believes itself called upon to impose its sanguinary despotism on the rest of the world.

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It must not be forgotten that the international Jew, who is to-day absolute master in Russia, does not look upon Germany as an ally, but as a State condemned to the same doom as Russia itself. One does not form an alliance with a partner whose only aim is the destruction of his co-partner. Above all, one does not enter into alliances with people to whom no treaty is sacred, because they do not exist as the upholders of truth and honour, but as the protagonists of lying and deception, thievery, plunder and robbery. The man who thinks that he can enter into a treaty with parasites is like a tree that believes it can make a bargain with the mistletoe that feeds on it.

(2) The menace to which Russia once succumbed is perpetually hanging over Germany. Only a bourgeois simpleton could imagine that the Bolshevist danger has been overcome. In his superficial way of thinking he does not suspect that here we are dealing with a phenomenon that is due to an urge of the blood, namely, the aspiration of the Jewish people to become the despots of the world. That aspiration is quite as natural as the impulse of the Anglo-Saxon to rule the world, and as the Anglo-Saxon chooses his own way of attaining those ends and fights for them with characteristic weapons, so does the Jew. The Jew follows his own methods, he insinuates himself into the very heart of the nations and then proceeds to undermine the national structure from within. The weapons with which he works are lies and calumny, poisonous infection and disintegration, intensifying the struggle until he has succeeded in exterminating his hated adversary to the accompaniment of much bloodshed. In Russian Bolshevism we must recognise the kind of attempt which is being made by the Jew in the twentieth century to secure dominion over the world. In other epochs he worked towards the same goal, but with different, though fundamentally similar, means. The ambition of the Jew is part and parcel of his very nature. Just as no other people would voluntarily check the instinct to increase in numbers or in power, unless forced to do so by external circumstances or senile decay, so the Jew will never, of his own accord, repress his eternal urge and abandon his struggle for world dictatorship.

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Only external forces can thwart him, or his instinct for world domination will die out with his race. If nations become impotent or extinct through senility it is because they have failed to preserve their racial purity. The Jews preserve the purity of their blood better than any other people on earth. Thus the Jew pursues his fateful course until he meets another and superior force and after a desperate struggle he who would have stormed the heavens is hurled back once more to the regions of Lucifer. To-day Germany is Bolshevism’s next objective. All the force of a fresh missionary idea is needed to rouse our nation once more, to free it from the toils of the international serpent and stop the process of corruption of our blood from within. The forces of our nation, thus liberated, may be employed to preserve our nationality and in this way, prevent a repetition of the recent catastrophe from taking place even in the most distant future. If this be the goal we set ourselves, it would be folly to ally ourselves with a country whose ruler is the mortal enemy of our future. How can we release our people from this poisonous grip if we ourselves accept it? How can we teach the German worker that Bolshevism is an infamous crime against humanity if we ally ourselves with this infernal abortion and recognise its existence as legitimate? What right have we to condemn the members of the broad masses whose sympathies lie with a certain Weltanschauung if the rulers of our State choose the representatives of that Weltanschauung as their allies? The struggle against the Jewish Bolshevisation of the world demands that we should declare our position towards Soviet Russia. We cannot cast out the Devil through Beelzebub. If to-day even völkisch circles are eager for an alliance with Russia, let there but pause to look around in Germany itself, in order that they may realise from what quarter their support comes.

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Do these people holding völkisch views believe that a policy which is recommended and acclaimed by the Marxist international press can benefit the German people? Since when do they fight with weapons provided by the Jew? One reproach which could be levelled against the old German Reich with regard to its policy of alliances was that it spoiled its relations towards all other States by continual vacillation and by its weakness in trying to preserve world peace at all costs, but one reproach which cannot be levelled against it is that it failed to maintain good relations with Russia. I frankly admit that, before the War, I thought it would have been better if Germany had abandoned her senseless colonial policy and her naval policy and had joined Britain in an alliance against Russia. Thereby Germany would renounce her weak world policy for a determined European policy, with the idea of acquiring new territory on the Continent. I do not forget the constant insolent threats which Pan-Slav Russia made against Germany. I do not forget the continual mobilisation rehearsals, the sole object of which was to irritate Germany. I cannot forget the tone of public opinion in Russia which, in pre-war days, excelled itself in hate-inspired outbursts against our nation and our Reich, nor can I forget the big Russian press which was always more favourable to France than to us. Yet, despite all this, another alternative was open to us before the War. We might have won the support of Russia and turned against Britain. Circumstances are entirely different to-day. Although, before the War, we might have swallowed our pride and marched at the side of Russia, that is no longer possible to-day. Since then the hand of the world-clock has moved forward and points the hour in which the destiny of our people must be decided one way or another. The present process of consolidation now being carried out by the great States of the world is the last warning signal to us to look to ourselves, to bring our people back from the realm of visions to the realm of hard facts and point the sole way into the future, which will lead the old Reich to a new era of prosperity.

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If, in view of this great and most important task before it, the, National Socialist Movement sets aside all illusions and takes reason as its sole guide, the catastrophe of 1918 may turn out to be an infinite blessing for the future of our nation. As a result of the collapse our nation may succeed in adopting an entirely new attitude with regard to foreign policy, and strengthened within by its new Weltanschauung, the German nation may finally stabilise its foreign policy. It may end by gaining what Britain has, what even Russia had, and what enabled France again and again to make analogous decisions which ultimately proved to be to her advantage, namely, a political testament. The fundamental principles of the political testament of the German nation determining the course of its foreign policy shall be as follows: Never permit two continental Powers to arise in Europe. Look upon every attempt to establish a second military Power on the frontiers of Germany, be it only in the shape of a State capable of becoming a military power, as tantamount to an attack upon Germany. Regard it not only as your right, but as your duty, to prevent by every possible means, including resort to arms, the establishment of such a State, and to crush it, should it be established. See to it that the strength of our nation does not rest on colonial foundations, but on those of our own native territory in Europe. Never consider the Reich secure unless, for centuries to come, it is in a position to give every descendant of our race a piece of ground that he can call his own. Never forget that the most sacred of all rights in this world is man’s right to the soil which he wishes to cultivate for himself and that the holiest of all sacrifices is that of the blood shed for it. I should not like to conclude these remarks without referring once again to the sole possibility of an alliance that exists for us in Europe at the present moment. In the previous chapter dealing with the problem of Germany’s policy of alliances, I mentioned Britain and Italy as the only countries with which it would be worth while for us to strive to form a close alliance and that such an alliance would be advantageous.

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I should like here to deal briefly with the military importance of such an alliance. The military consequences of this alliance would be the direct opposite of the consequences of an alliance with Russia. Most important of all is the fact that a rapprochement with Britain and Italy would in no way involve a danger of war. The only Power liable to oppose such an alliance would be France who would scarcely be in a position to do so. Thus, such an alliance would afford Germany an opportunity of quietly making those preparations which, within the framework of such a coalition, would necessarily have to lie made with a view to settling accounts with France. The lull significance of such an alliance lies in the fact that its conclusion would not automatically lay Germany open to the threat of invasion, but that the very coalition would be broken up, that is to say, the Entente which has been the cause of so many of our misfortunes, would be dissolved, thus making France, our inveterate enemy, the victim of violation. Even though this success would at first have only a moral effect, it would be sufficient to allow Germany such liberty of action as we cannot now imagine, for the new Anglo-German-Italian alliance would have the political initiative and no longer France. A further result would be that at one stroke Germany would finally be delivered from her unfavourable strategical position. On the one side, her flank would be strongly protected and, on the other, the guarantee that we would have an adequate supply of foodstuffs and raw materials would be a beneficial result of this new coalition of States. Almost more important, however, is the fact that this new league would include States whose potential of technical production would, in many respects, be mutually complementary. For the first time Germany would have allies who would not like vampires suck the life-blood of her industry, but could, and would, contribute liberally to the completion of our technical equipment.

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We must not forget one final fact, namely, that in this case we should not have allies like Turkey or present-day Russia. The greatest World Power on this earth and a young national State would constitute factors in a European struggle which were very different from the corrupt and decadent Powers to which Germany was allied in the last war. As I have already said, there are great obstacles in the way of such an alliance. But was not the formation of the Entente somewhat more difficult? Where King Edward VII succeeded, partly in the face of traditional interests, we must and will succeed, if we are so convinced of the necessity for such a development that we are wisely prepared to conquer our own feelings and carry the policy through. This will be possible only when, driven to action by suffering and distress, we renounce the shilly-shallying foreign policy of recent decades and follow unswervingly a course of action in pursuit of a definite aim. The future goal of our foreign policy ought to be neither a Western nor an Eastern bias; it ought to be an Eastern policy the object of which is the acquisition of such territory as is necessary in order that the German people can live. To carry out this policy we need that force of which France, the mortal enemy of our nation, is now depriving us by holding us in her grip and pitilessly robbing us of our strength. We must, therefore, stop at no sacrifice in an effort to stop France’s striving for hegemony in Europe. As our natural ally to-day we have every Power on the Continent which, like ourselves, feels France’s lust for mastery in Europe unbearable. No attempt to approach those Powers ought to appear too difficult to us, and no sacrifice should be considered too great, if the final outcome would be to make it possible for us to overthrow our most bitter enemy. The minor wounds will be cured by the beneficent influence of Time, once the major wound has been cauterised and closed.

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Naturally, the internal enemies of our people will howl with rage, but let us, as National Socialists, not be misled into ceasing to advocate what our most profound conviction tells us to be necessary. We must oppose the current of public opinion which will be led astray by Jewish cunning in exploiting our German lack of perception. The waves may often rage and roar around us; but the man who swims with the current attracts less attention than he who buffets it. To-day we are but a rock in the river. In a few years Fate may raise us up as a dam against which the general current will be broken, only to flow forward in a new bed. It is, therefore, necessary that in the eyes of the rest of the world our Movement should be recognised as representing a definite political programme. Whatever fate Heaven may have in store for us, we must be recognised by an outward and visible sign. As long as we ourselves recognise the ineluctable necessity which must determine our foreign policy, this knowledge will lend us that power of endurance which we often require when, under the withering fire of the opposition press, some of us experience fear and are assailed by the temptation to make concessions here or there and ‘to do as the Romans do,’ in order not to have the whole world against us.

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CHAPTER XV: THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE

After we had laid down our arms, in November 1918, a policy was adopted which, as far as man could foretell, was bound to lead gradually to our complete subjugation. Analogous examples culled from history show that those nations which lay down their arms without being absolutely forced to do so, subsequently prefer to submit to the greatest humiliations and exactions rather than try to change their fate by resorting to arms again. That can be explained on purely human grounds. A shrewd conqueror will always enforce his demands on the conquered only by stages, as far as that is possible. Then he may be reasonably certain that a people who have lost all strength of character (which is always true of every nation that voluntarily submits to the threats of an opponent) will not find in any of these acts of oppression, if one be enforced apart from the other, sufficient grounds for taking up arms again. The more often the conquered nation submits to extortion, the less justifiable in its eyes is the final revolt against a fresh and apparently isolated, but constantly recurring act of extortion, especially if more and greater misfortunes have already been borne in silence and with patience. The fall of Carthage is a terrible example of the slow destruction of a people for which they themselves were to blame. In his Drei Bekenntnisse, Clausewitz expressed this idea admirably and gave it a definite form when he said, ‘The stigma of shame incurred by cowardly submission can never be effaced. The drop of poison which thus enters the blood of a nation will be transmitted to posterity. It will undermine and paralyse the strength of later generations.’ But he added that, on the contrary, ‘even the loss of liberty after a sanguinary and honourable struggle ensures the resurgence of a nation and is the vital nucleus from which a new tree will one day put forth sound roots.’ Naturally, a nation which has lost all sense of honour and all strength of character will not feel the force of such a doctrine, but any nation that takes it to heart will never fall so low.

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Only those who forget it or do not wish to acknowledge it will collapse. Hence, those responsible for a cowardly submission cannot be expected suddenly to change their line of conduct in accordance with the dictates of common sense and human experience. On the contrary, they will repudiate such a doctrine, either until the people becomes habituated to the yoke of slavery or until the better elements of the nation come to the fore and wrest the power from the hands of the infamous corrupter. In the first case these who hold power will be pleased with the state of affairs, because the conquerors often entrust them with the duties of slave-driver, and they, as utterly characterless beings, are then more cruel in the exercise of their authority over their own countrymen than the most cruel alien appointed to the task by the enemy. The events which happened in Germany after 1918 prove how the hope of securing the clemency of the victor by means of a voluntary submission had the most disastrous influence on the political attitude and conduct of the broad masses. I say ‘the broad masses’ expressly, because I cannot persuade myself that the things which were done or left undone by the leaders of the people are to be attributed to a similar disastrous illusion. Seeing that since the war our fate has been in the hands of the Jews, and to-day admittedly so, it is impossible to assume that a defective knowledge of the state of affairs was the sole cause of our misfortunes. On the contrary, we may take it for granted that our people were intentionally brought to ruin. Looked at from this point of view the apparent insanity of our government’s foreign policy is revealed as a piece of shrewd calculating logic, put into effect in order to promote the Jewish idea of a struggle for world-mastery. Thus it appears comprehensible that the same period of seven years, which, after 1806, sufficed to imbue Prussia (which had been in a state of collapse) with fresh vitality and the zeal for battle, has to-day not only been wasted, but has led to a steady sapping of the vital strength of the State.

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Seven years after November 1918 the Locarno Pact was signed. Thus the development which occurred took the form I have indicated above. Once the shameful Armistice had been signed, our people were unable to pluck up sufficient courage and energy to offer a sudden resistance to the oppressive measures adopted and constantly repeated by the enemy, who was too shrewd to put forward too many demands at once. He invariably limited his exactions to, amounts which, in his opinion and that of our German Government, could be submitted to for the moment, thus avoiding the risk of an outburst of public feeling. But, the more frequently single impositions were accepted and tolerated, the less justifiable did it appear to do now, on account of one single imposition or attempted humiliation, what had not been done previously in the case of so many others, namely, to offer resistance. That is the ‘drop of poison’ of which Clausewitz speaks. Once this lack of character is manifested the resultant condition becomes steadily aggravated and weighs like an evil heritage on all future decisions. It may become a millstone round the nation’s neck, which cannot be shaken off, but which forces it to drag out its existence in slavery. Thus, in Germany measures enforcing disarmament, oppression, economic spoliation and measures designed to render us politically defenceless followed one upon the other. The result of all this was to create that mood which made so many look upon the Dawes Plan as a blessing and the Locarno Pact as a success. From a higher point of view we may speak of one sole blessing in the midst of so much misery, namely, that, though men may be fooled, Heaven cannot be bribed, for Heaven withheld its blessing. Since that time misery and anxiety have been the constant companions of our people, and distress is the one ally that has remained loyal to us. Here, too, Destiny has made no exceptions. It has given us our deserts. Since we did not know how to value honour, it has taught us to value liberty through want of bread. Now that the nation has learned to cry for bread, it may one day learn to pray for freedom.

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Bitter and obvious as the collapse of our nation was in the years following 1918 that was nevertheless the time chosen to persecute with the utmost severity anyone who presumed to foretell what afterwards invariably took place. This was particularly so when it was a question of ‘silencing’ warning voices which were unwelcome because unpleasant. The government to which our people submitted was as hopelessly incompetent as it was conceited, and this was evinced in their attitude towards those who made themselves unpopular by issuing disconcerting warnings. Then we saw, as we can see to-day, the greatest parliamentary nincompoops, really common saddlers and glove-makers (not merely by trade, for that would signify very little) suddenly raised to the rank of statesmen and sermonising to humble mortals from that pedestal. It did not matter, and it still does not matter, that such a ‘statesman,’ after having displayed his talents for six months is shown up for what he is, namely, a mere windbag, and becomes the object of public scorn. It does not matter that he has given the most conclusive proof of complete incompetency. On the contrary, the less real the service parliamentary statesmen of this Republic render the country, the more savagely do they persecute all who expect them to achieve something or who dare to point to their failures and to predict similar failures in the future. Should anyone finally succeed in pinning down one of these parliamentarians to hard facts, so that this ‘statesman’ is unable to deny the failure of his whole policy and its results, he will find innumerable excuses for his lack of success, but will in no way admit that he himself, is the chief cause of the evil. By the winter of 1922–23, at the latest, it ought to have, been generally recognised that, even after the conclusion of peace, France was still endeavouring with iron consistency to realise her original war aims. It is inconceivable that for four and a half years France should have continued to sacrifice the none too abundant supply of her national blood in the most decisive struggle throughout her history in order subsequently to obtain compensation through reparations for the damages sustained.

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Even Alsace and Lorraine, taken by themselves, would not account for the energy with which the French conducted the War, if Alsace-Lorraine were not already considered as a part of the really vast programme which French foreign policy had envisaged for the future. The aim of that programme was the dismemberment of Germany into a number of small states. It was for this that chauvinist France waged war, and in so doing she was in reality selling her people as mercenaries to the international Jew. This French war aim would have been attained through the World War if, as was originally hoped in Paris, the struggle had been fought out on German soil. Let us imagine the bloody battles of the World War not as having taken place on the Somme, in Flanders, in Artois, outside Warsaw, NishniNovogorod, Kowno and Riga, but in Germany, in the Ruhr or on the Maine, on the Elbe, outside Hanover, Leipzig, Nürnberg, etc.; had this happened, then we must admit that the destruction of Germany might have been accomplished. It is very doubtful whether our young federal State could have borne the hard struggle for four and a half years, as it was borne by a France that had been centralised for centuries, with the whole national imagination focussed on Paris. If this titanic conflict between the nations took place beyond the frontiers of our Fatherland, not only is all the merit due to the immortal service rendered by our old Army, but it was also very fortunate for the future of Germany. I am of the firm conviction (and this conviction often fills me with dread) that if things had taken a different course there would no longer be a German Reich, but only ‘German states,’ and that is the only reason why the blood which was shed by our friends and brothers during the War was not shed quite in vain. Events took a different turn. In November 1918 Germany did indeed collapse with lightning suddenness, but when the catastrophe took place at home the Army was still holding a line deep in the enemy’s country.

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At that time France’s first preoccupation was not the dismemberment of Germany, but the problem of how to get the German troops out of France, and Belgium as quickly as possible. In order to put an end to the War, the first thing that had to be done by the French Government was to disarm the German troops and push them back into Germany if possible. Until this was done the French could not devote their attention to realising their own particular and original war aims. France was, however, hindered in this by the fact that as far as Britain was concerned, the War was really only won when Germany was destroyed as a colonial and commercial power, and was reduced to the rank of a secondclass State. It was not to Britain’s interest to wipe out the German State altogether. In fact, on many grounds it was desirable for her to have a future rival against France in Europe. France was therefore forced to carry on by peaceful means the work for which the War had paved the way; and Clemenceau’s statement, that for him peace was merely a continuation of the War, thus acquired added significance. Persistently and at every possible opportunity the effort to dislocate the framework of the Reich had to be continued. By perpetually sending new notes that demanded disarmament, on the one hand, and by the imposition of economic levies, on the other, which could be carried out as a result of the process of disarmament, it was hoped in Paris that the framework of the Reich would gradually become unstable. The more the Germans lost their sense of national honour, the more would economic pressure and continued economic distress be effective as factors of political destruction. Such a policy of political oppression and economic exploitation, carried out for ten or twenty years, must it was believed, in the long run steadily ruin and eventually disintegrate the most solid national body. Then the French war aims would have been definitely attained. By the winter of 1922–23 the intentions of the French must have long been obvious. There remained only two possible ways of confronting the situation.

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It was hoped that either French determination might be blunted by the toughness of the German national body, or, that it might at least be possible to do what was bound to become inevitable one day—that is to say, under the provocation of some particularly brutal act of oppression to put the helm of the German ship of state to roundabout and ram the enemy. That would naturally involve a life-and-death struggle. The chance of surviving this struggle depended on whether France could be so far isolated beforehand that in this second conflict, Germany would not have to fight against the whole world, but in defence of Germany against a France that was persistently disturbing the peace of the world. I insist on this point, and I am profoundly convinced that it is inevitable that this second alternative will one day come about. I shall never believe that France will of herself alter her intentions towards us, because they are, at bottom, only the expression of the French instinct for self-preservation. Were I a Frenchman, and were the greatness of France as dear to me as that of Germany is sacred, I neither could nor would act otherwise than a Clemenceau. The French nation, which is slowly dying out, not so much through depopulation as through the progressive disappearance of the best elements of the race, can continue to play an important role in the world only if Germany be dismembered. French policy may make a thousand detours on the march towards its fixed goal, but the destruction of Germany is the end which it always has in view as the fulfilment of the most profound desire and ultimate intentions of the French. Now, it is a mistake to believe that if the will on one side remains merely passive and intent on its own self-preservation, it can hold out permanently against another will which is not less forceful, but is active. As long as the eternal conflict between France and Germany is waged only in the form of a German defence against the French attack, it will never be brought to a conclusion, although Germany will, in the course of centuries, lose one foothold after another.

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If we study the changes, the line of demarcation of the German language has undergone from the twelfth century up to our day, in the frontier, within which the German language is spoken, we can hardly hope for future success from an attitude and development which have hitherto been so detrimental to us. Only when the Germans have fully realised all this will they cease to allow the national will to live to peter out in passive defence, but will rally it for a last decisive contest with France and a final struggle for the realisation of Germany’s highest aims. Only then will it be possible to put an end to the eternal Franco-German conflict which has hitherto proved so sterile. Of course it is here presumed that Germany sees in the suppression of France nothing more than a means which will make it possible for our people finally to expand in another direction. To-day there are eighty million Germans in Europe, and our foreign policy will be recognised as rightly conducted only when, after barely a hundred years, there will be two hundred and fifty million Germans living on this Continent, not packed together like coolies and working in factories at the bidding of the rest of the world, but as tillers of the soil and workers whose labours will be a mutual guarantee for their existence. In December 1922, the situation between Germany and France assumed a particularly threatening aspect. France had new and comprehensive oppressive measures in view and needed pledges. Political pressure had to precede economic exploitation, and the French believed that only by making a violent attack upon the central nervous system of German life would they be able to make our ‘recalcitrant’ people bow to their galling yoke. By the occupation of the Ruhr, it was hoped in France that not only would the moral backbone of Germany be finally broken, but that we should be reduced to such grave economic straits that we should be forced to subscribe willy-nilly to the heaviest possible obligations. It was a question of bending and breaking Germany. At first Germany bent and subsequently broke down completely. Through the occupation of the Ruhr, Fate once more reached out its hand to the German people and gave them the chance to arise, for what at first appeared as a heavy stroke of misfortune was found, on closer examination, to be an extremely promising opportunity of bringing Germany’s sufferings to an end.

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As regards foreign politics, the action of France in occupying the Ruhr really estranged Britain for the first time, Indeed it estranged not merely British diplomatic circles, which had concluded, appraised and upheld the AngloFrench alliance in a spirit of calm and objective calculation, but it also estranged large sections of the British public. The English business-world in particular ill concealed its displeasure at this incredible additional strengthening of the power of France on the Continent. Not only had France now assumed from the military standpoint alone a position in Europe such as Germany herself had not held previously, but she thus obtained control of economic resources which, from the practical point of view, combined her ability to compete in the political world with economic advantages almost amounting to a monopoly. The most important iron and coal mines in Europe were now all in the hands of one nation which, in contrast to Germany, had hitherto defended its vital interests in an active and resolute fashion and which had, during the Great War, given the world fresh proof of its military efficiency. The French occupation of the Ruhr coal-fields effectively cancelled all that Britain had gained by the War, and the victors were no longer the diligent and painstaking British statesmen, but Marshal Foch and the France he represented. In Italy also the attitude towards France, which, in any case, had not been very favourable since the end of the War, now became positively hostile. The great and critical moment had come when the Allies of yesterday might become the enemies of to-morrow. The fact that events took another course and that the Allies did not suddenly come into conflict with one another, as in the Second Balkan War, was due to the fact that Germany had no Enver Pasha, but merely a Cuno, as Chancellor of the Reich. Nevertheless, the French invasion of the Ruhr opened up great possibilities for the future, not only in the field of Germany’s foreign policy, but also of her internal politics.

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A considerable section of our people who, thanks to the persistent influence of a mendacious press, had looked upon France as the champion of progress and liberty, were suddenly cured of its illusion. As in 1914 the dream of international solidarity was suddenly banished from the minds of our German working class and they were brought back to the world of everlasting struggle, where one creature feeds on the other and where the death of the weaker implies the life of the stronger, so again in the spring of 1923. When the French put their threat into effect and penetrated, at first hesitatingly and cautiously, into the coal-field of the Ruhr the hour of destiny had struck for Germany. If, at that moment, our people had changed not only their frame of mind, but also their conduct, the German Ruhr could have been made for France what Moscow was for Napoleon. Indeed, there were only two possibilities—either to tolerate this new move, in addition to all the rest and to do nothing, or to focus the attention of the German people on, that region of sweltering forges and blazing furnaces, thus firing them with the determination to put an end to this persistent humiliation and to face the horrors of the moment rather than submit to a terror that was endless. Cuno, who was then Chancellor of the Reich, can claim the immortal merit of having discovered a third way, and our German bourgeois political parties merit the still greater glory of having admired him and collaborated with him. I shall first deal as briefly as possible with the second alternative. By occupying the Ruhr, France committed a flagrant violation of the Versailles Treaty. Her action brought her into conflict with several of the guarantor Powers, and especially with Britain and Italy. She could no longer hope that those States would back her in her egotistic act of brigandage. She could only count on bringing the adventure, for such it was at the start, to a satisfactory conclusion by her own unaided efforts. For a German National Government there was only one alternative, namely, the course which honour prescribed. Certainly at the beginning we could not have opposed France with active armed resistance, but it should have been clearly recognised that any negotiations which did not have the argument of force to back them up would turn out futile and ridiculous.

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It was absurd to adopt the attitude, ‘We refuse to take part in any negotiations,’ unless there was a possibility of offering active resistance, but it was still more absurd to consent finally to negotiate without having meantime organised a supporting force. At the same time, it was, of course, impossible for us to prevent the occupation of the Ruhr by the adoption of military measures. Only a madman could have recommended such a course, but while the impression made by the French action lasted and during the time that that action was being carried out, measures could have been, and should have been undertaken without any regard to the Versailles Treaty—which France herself had violated—to collect a military force which would serve as a collateral argument to back up the negotiators later on. For it was quite clear from the beginning that the fate of this district occupied by the French would one day be decided at some conference table or other. It must also be quite clear to everybody that even the best negotiators have little hope of success as long as the ground on which they stand and the very chair on which they sit are not under the armed protection of their own people. A weak pigmy cannot argue with athletes and a negotiator without armed defence at his back must always acquiesce when a Brennus throws his sword into the scales on the enemy’s side, unless he can preserve the balance with an equally mighty sword of his own. It was distressing to watch the comedy of negotiations which, ever since 1918, regularly preceded each arbitrary dictate that the enemy imposed upon us. We presented a sorry spectacle in the eyes of the whole world when we were invited, as if in derision, to attend conferences, simply to be presented with decisions and programmes which had already been drawn up and passed a long time previously, and which, though we were permitted to discuss them, had, from the outset, to be considered as unalterable.

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It is true that in scarcely a single instance were our negotiators men of more than mediocre ability. For the most part they justified only too well the sarcastic remark made by Lloyd George with reference to Herr Simon, an excabinet minister of the Reich, that the Germans were not able to choose men of intelligence as their leaders and representatives. But in face of the enemy’s resolute determination to acquire power, on the one side, and the lamentable defencelessness of Germany, on the other, even a genius could have achieved but little. In the spring of 1923, however, anyone who weighed the possibility of seizing the opportunity of the French invasion of the Ruhr to reconstruct the military power of Germany would first have had to restore to the nation its moral weapons, to reinforce its will-power, and to do away with those who had destroyed this most valuable element of national strength. Just as in 1918 we had to pay with our blood for failure to crush the Marxist serpent underfoot once and for all in 1914 and 1915, we have now to suffer retribution for the fact that in the spring of 1923, we did not seize the opportunity then offered us for finally putting a stop to the mischief being done by the Marxist traitors and murderers. Any idea of offering real resistance to the French was pure folly as long as the fight had not been taken up against those forces which, five years previously, had broken German resistance on the battlefields by the influence which they exercised at home. Only bourgeois minds could have arrived at the ‘incredible conviction that Marxism had probably become quite a different thing now and that the unprincipled ringleaders of 1918, who callously used the bodies of our two million dead as stepping-stones on which they climbed into various government positions, would now, in the year 1923, suddenly show themselves ready to pay tribute to the national conscience. It was veritably a piece of incredible folly to expect that those traitors would suddenly appear as the champions of German freedom. They had no intention of doing so. Just as a hyena will not abandon its carrion, a Marxist will not give up betraying his country. It is beside the point to put forward the stupid argument, that so and so many workers gave their lives for Germany. That is true, but then they were no longer internationally minded Marxists.

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If, in 1914, the German working class had consisted of real Marxists, the War would have ended within three weeks. Germany would have collapsed before the first soldier had put a foot beyond the frontier. The fact that the German people carried on the War proved that the Marxist delusion had not yet penetrated deeply, but as the War dragged on German soldiers and workers gradually fell once more under the spell of the Marxist leaders, and to the same degree in which they relapsed, their country was bereft of their services. If, at the beginning of the War, or even during the War, twelve or, fifteen thousand of these Jewish corruptors of the people had been forced to submit to poison-gas, just as hundreds of thousands of our best German workers from every social class and from every trade and calling had to face it in the field, then the millions of sacrifices made at the front would not have been made in vain. On the contrary, if twelve thousand of these malefactors had been eliminated in time, probably the lives of a million decent men, who would have been of service to Germany in the future, might have been saved. But it was in accordance with bourgeois ‘statesmanship’ to hand over, without batting an eyelid, millions of human beings to be slaughtered on the battlefield, and to look upon ten or twelve thousand public traitors, profiteers, usurers and swindlers, as the nation’s most precious and most sacred asset and to publicly proclaim their persons inviolable. Indeed it would be hard to, say what is the most outstanding feature of these bourgeois circles, mental debility, moral weakness and cowardice, or rascally ideology. It is a class that is certainly doomed to go under, but, unhappily, it drags down the whole nation with it into the depths. The situation in 1923 was similar to that of 1918. No matter what form of resistance was decided upon, the first prerequisite for taking action was the elimination of the Marxist poison from the body of the nation, and in my opinion it was the first task of a really National government to seek and to find those forces that were determined to wage a war of annihilation against Marxism and to give those forces a free hand. It was their duty not to bow down before the fetish of ‘law and order’ at a moment when the enemy from without was dealing the Fatherland a death blow and when high treason was lurking at every streetcorner at home.

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A really National government ought then to have welcomed disorder and unrest, if this turmoil afforded an opportunity of finally settling with the Marxists, who are the mortal enemies of our people. This opportunity having been neglected, it was sheer folly to think of resisting, no matter what form that resistance might take. Of course, to settle accounts with the Marxists on a scale which would be of genuine historical and universal importance could not be effected along lines laid down by some secret council or according to a plan concocted in the worn-out brain of some cabinet minister. It would have to be in accordance with the eternal laws of life on this Earth which are, and will remains those of a ceaseless struggle for existence. It must be remembered, that in many instances a hardy and healthy nation has emerged from the ordeal of bloody civil war, while from peace conditions which had been artificially maintained there often resulted a state of national putrescence that reeked to heaven. The fate of a nation cannot be altered with the velvet glove and in 1923 the iron hand should have been used ruthlessly to crush the vipers that battened on the body of the nation. Only after this had been done would preparations for active resistance have had any point. At that time I often talked myself hoarse trying to make clear, at least to the so-called national circles, how much was then at stake, and that by repeating the errors committed in 1914 and the subsequent years we would inevitably meet with the same catastrophe as in 1918. I frequently implored them to let Fate have a free hand and to make it possible for our Movement to settle with the Marxists, but I preached to deaf ears. All of them, including the Chief of the Defence Forces, thought they knew better, until finally they found themselves forced to subscribe to the vilest capitulation in the records of history. I then became profoundly convinced that the German bourgeoisie had come to the end of its mission and was not capable of fulfilling any further function.

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Then, too, I recognised that all the bourgeois parties had been fighting Marxism merely out of a spirit of competition without sincerely wishing to destroy it. They had long ago become reconciled to the idea that their country was doomed to destruction and their one care was to secure good seats at the funeral banquet. It was for this alone that they kept on ‘fighting.’ At that time (I admit it freely) I conceived a profound admiration for the great man beyond the Alps, whose ardent love for his people inspired him not to bargain with Italy’s internal enemies, but to use every possible means in an effort to wipe them out. What places Mussolini in the ranks of the world’s great men is his decision not to share Italy with the Marxists, but to redeem his country from Marxism by destroying internationalism. What miserable pygmies our sham statesmen in Germany appear by comparison with him! How nauseating it is to witness the conceit and effrontery of these nonentities in criticising a man who is a thousand times greater than they, and how humiliating it is to think that this takes place in a country which as recently fifty years ago had a Bismarck for its leader! The attitude adopted by the bourgeoisie in 1923 and the way in which they dealt kindly with Marxism decided from the outset the fate of any attempt at active resistance in the Ruhr. With that deadly enemy in our own ranks it was sheer folly to think of fighting France. The most that could then be done was to stage a sham fight in order to satisfy the German national element to some extent, to tranquillize the ‘seething indignation of the public,’ or dope it, which was what was really intended. Had they really believed in what they did, they ought to have recognised that the strength of a nation lies, primarily, not in its arms, but in its will, and that before setting out to conquer the external enemy, the enemy at home must be exterminated; otherwise, disaster must result if victory be not achieved on the very first day of the fight.

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The shadow of one defeat is sufficient to break the resistance of a nation that has not been liberated from its internal enemies, and give the adversary the final victory. In the spring of 1923 all this might have been foreseen. It is useless to ask whether it was then possible to count on a military success against France, for had the result of the German action in regard to the French invasion of the Ruhr been only the destruction of Marxism at home, success would have been on our side. Once liberated from the deadly enemies of her present and future existence, Germany would possess forces which no power in the world could strangle again. On the day when Marxism is broken in Germany, the chains that bind her will be smashed for ever, for never in the course of our history have we been conquered by the might of our enemies, but only through our own failings and the enemy in our own camp. Since the German Government of that day were unable to decide on such a heroic step, the only alternative left was to house the first course, namely, to do nothing and let things slide. But, at this crucial moment, Heaven sent Germany a great man in the person of Herr Cuno. He was neither a statesman nor a politician by profession, still less a born politician, but he was a kind of political office-boy who was entrusted with odd jobs. Apart from that, he was more of a business-man. It was Germany’s misfortune that this politicising business-man looked upon politics in the light of business and acted accordingly. ‘France has occupied the Ruhr. What is there in the Ruhr? Coal. Then France has occupied the Ruhr for the sake of its coal!’ What was more natural than that Herr Cuno should hit on the idea of a strike in order to prevent the French from obtaining coal? Then (at least so argued Herr Cuno), they would leave the Ruhr one fine day since the occupation had not turned out to be a paying speculation. Such were approximately the lines along which that outstanding national statesman reasoned.

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At Stuttgart and in other places he addressed ‘his people’ and his people were lost in admiration. Of course they needed the Marxists for the strike, because the strike had necessarily to be an action undertaken by the workers. It was, therefore, essential to bring the worker (who to a bourgeois statesman such as Cuno, was one and the same thing as a Marxist) into a united front with all other Germans. It was wonderful to see how the countenances of these moth-eaten bourgeois party politicians beamed with delight when the great genius spoke the word of revelation to them. Here was a nationalist and a man of genius. At last they had discovered what they had so long sought, for now the gulf between Marxism and themselves could be bridged over. Thus it became possible for the pseudo-nationalist to play the heavy Teuton to adopt a nationalist pose and at the same time to extend the trusty hand of friendship to the internationalist traitors of his country. The traitors readily grasped that hand, because, just as Herr Cuno had need of the Marxist chiefs for his ‘united front,’ the Marxist chiefs needed Herr Cuno’s money. Both parties, therefore, benefited by the transaction. Cuno obtained his united front, constituted of nationalist chatterboxes and anti-national swindlers, and now, with the help of the money paid to them by the State, the international imposters were able to pursue their glorious mission, which was to destroy the national economic system, this time at the expense of the State. It was a stroke of genius to think of saving a nation by means of a general strike in which the strikers were paid by the State. It was a command that could be enthusiastically obeyed by the most indifferent of loafers. Everybody knows that prayers will not liberate a nation, but history has yet to show whether a nation can be set free by ‘downing tools.’ If instead of promoting a paid general strike at that, time, and making this the basis of his ‘united front,’ Herr Cuno had demanded two hours more work from every German, then the swindle of the ‘united front’ would have been over and done with, within three days. Nations do not obtain their freedom by refusing to work, but by making sacrifices.

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Anyhow, the so-called passive resistance could not last long. Nobody but a man entirely ignorant of war could imagine that an army of occupation could be frightened and driven out by such ridiculous means, and yet this could have been the only purpose of an action for which the country had to pay out milliards and which contributed seriously to devaluate the national currency. Of course, the French were able to settle down comfortably in the Ruhr with an easy mind the moment they saw that such ridiculous measures were being adopted against them. We ourselves had shown them the best way of bringing a recalcitrant civilian population to a sense of reason, if its, conduct implied a serious danger to the officials which the army of occupation had placed in authority. Nine years previously we had with lightning-like rapidity wiped out bands of Belgian francs-tireurs and made the civilian population clearly understand the seriousness of the situation, when the activities of these bands threatened grave danger to the German Army. Similarly, if passive resistance in the Ruhr had really become a menace to the French, the armies of occupation would have needed no more than eight days to bring the whole piece of childish nonsense to a gruesome end. The fundamental question will always be, what are we to do if passive resistance reaches a point where it really gets on the nerves of our opponents and they proceed to suppress it with force and bloodshed? Are we still to resist? If so, then we must, whether we like it or not, submit to severe and bloody persecution, and in that case we shall be faced with the same situation which we should have had to face, had we offered active resistance, in other words, we should have to fight. Therefore, so-called passive resistance would be logical only if supported by the determination to continue this resistance, if necessary, either in an open fight or by means of guerilla warfare. Generally speaking, such a struggle is never carried on, except in the conviction that success is possible. A besieged stronghold, hard pressed by the enemy, surrenders, to all practical purposes, at that moment when it is forced to abandon all hope of relief, especially if, in such a case, the defenders are attracted by the promise of life instead of probable death.

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Let the garrison of a citadel which has been completely encircled by the enemy once lose all hope of deliverance, and the spirit of the defenders is broken immediately. That is why, if one considers the consequences to which it must inevitably have led, if it was to prove successful, passive resistance in the Ruhr had no practical meaning unless an active front had been organised to support it. In that case a tremendous effort might have been demanded of our nation. If all the Westphalians in the Ruhr could have been assured that the home country had mobilised an army of eighty or a hundred divisions to support them, the French would have found themselves treading on thorns. Surely a greater number of courageous men could have been found to sacrifice themselves for a successful enterprise than for an enterprise that was manifestly futile. This was the classic occasion that induced us National Socialists to take up a resolute stand against the so-called national battle-cry. During those months I was attacked by people whose patriotism was a mixture of stupidity and humbug and who took part in the general hue and cry because of the pleasant sensation they felt at being suddenly enabled to show themselves as nationalists, without thereby incurring any danger. In my estimation, this despicable united front was one of the most ridiculous phenomena imaginable, and events proved that I was right. As soon as the trade-unions had nearly filled their treasuries with Cuno’s contributions, and the moment had come for passive resistance to change over from inert defence to active aggression, the ‘Red’ hyenas suddenly broke out of the national sheepfold and appeared in their true light. Silently, Herr Cuno stole back to his business. Germany was richer by one experience and poorer by the loss of one great hope. Up to midsummer of that year several officers, who certainly were not the least brave and honourable of their kind, had not really believed that the course of things could take a turn that wits so humiliating. They had all hoped that—if not openly, then at least secretly—the necessary measures would be taken to make this insolent French invasion a turning-point in German history.

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In our ranks also there were many who counted on the intervention of the Reich Army. That conviction was so ardent that it exerted a decisive influence on the conduct and especially on the training of innumerable young men. But when the disgraceful collapse actually took place, and, after millions of German money had been spent in vain and thousands of young Germans who had been foolish enough to trust in the promises made by the rulers of the Reich had been sacrificed, the Government capitulated in the most humiliating way, public indignation at such a betrayal of our unhappy nation blazed forth. Millions, of people now became fully convinced that Germany could be saved only if the whole prevailing system were destroyed root and branch. There never had been a more propitious moment for such a solution. On the one hand, an act of high treason had been committed against the country, openly and shamelessly. On the other, a nation was, economically speaking, delivered over to slow starvation. Since the State itself had trampled upon all precepts of faith and loyalty, made a mockery of the rights of its citizens, rendered the sacrifice of millions of its most loyal sons fruitless and robbed other millions of their last penny, it could no longer expect anything but hatred from its subjects. This hatred against those who had ruined the people and the country was bound to find an outlet in one form or another. In this connection I quote here the concluding sentence of a speech which I delivered at the great trial that took place in the spring of 1924. “Let the judges of this State condemn us for our conduct at that time; History, the goddess of a higher truth and a finer justice, will smile as she tears up their verdict and will acquit us of all guilt.” But History will then also summon before its own tribunal, those who, invested with power, have trampled on law and justice, condemning our people to misery and ruin, and who, in the hour of their country’s misfortune, took more account of their own ego than of the life of the community. I shall not here relate the history of the events leading up to November 8th, 1923, and ending with that date. I shall not do so, because I cannot see that this would serve any beneficial purpose in the future and also because no good could come of opening old sores that have only just healed.

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Moreover, it would be out of place to talk about the guilt of men who, perhaps in the depths of their hearts, loved their people equally well and who merely failed to take the same path or did not recognise it as the right one to take. In the face of the great misfortune which has befallen our Fatherland and which affects us all, I must abstain from offending and perhaps disuniting those men who must, at some future date, form one great united front which will be made up of true and loyal Germans and which will have to withstand the common front presented by the enemy of our people. For I know that a time will come when those who then treated us as enemies will venerate the men who trod the bitter way of death for the sake of their people. I have dedicated the first volume of this book to our eighteen fallen heroes. Here, at the end of this second volume, let me again, before the adherents and champions of our ideals, evoke the memory of those men as heroes who, in the full consciousness of what they were doing, sacrificed their lives for us all. They must always recall the weak and wavering to a sense of their duty that same duty which they themselves fulfilled loyally even to the making of the supreme sacrifice. I regard as one of their number that man who, as one of the best among us, devoted his life, in his works, in his philosophy and finally in action, to awakening the nation that was his and ours.

That man was DIETRICH ECKART.

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EPILOGUE

On November 9, 1923, in the fourth year of its existence, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party was dissolved and prohibited in the whole Reich territory. To-day, in November, 1926, it stands again free before us, stronger and inwardly firmer than ever before. All the persecutions of the movement and its individual leaders, all vilifications and slanders, were powerless to harm it. The correctness of its ideas, the purity of its will, its supporters’ spirit of self-sacrifice, have caused it to issue from all repressions strong than ever. If, in the world of our present parliamentary corruption, it becomes more and more aware of the profoundest essence of its struggle, feels itself to be the purest embodiment of the value of race and personality and conducts itself accordingly, it will with almost mathematical certainty some day emerge victorious from its struggle. Just as Germany must inevitably win her rightful position on this earth if she is led and organized according to the same principles. A state which in this age of racial poisoning dedicates itself to the care of its best racial elements must some day become lord of the earth. May the adherents of our movement never forget this if ever the magnitude of the sacrifices should beguile them to an anxious comparison with the possible results.

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